Friday, December 17, 2010

Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart 's Business Model Framework

Short description of framework: A framework illustrating how value is created and captured by an organization through the decisions made and the resulting consequences, illustrated in causal loops.

Main strengths: The framework captures what an organization is trying to do, key values the management wants to create, and the incentives for suppliers, partners, and customers. It also illustrates if management is stringent in its decisions and if different choices results in consequences that reinforce each other or not.

Background
Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart based their framework on the four major categories common to most business model definitions uncovered by Shafer, Smith and Linder in their article The Power of Business Models, from 2005.
Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart argue that “consistent with the intuitive view of the concept, a business model is defined by strategic choices, sometimes made by a network of organizations, that explain value creation and value capture by the focal organization” and conclude that one important component of business models are the concrete choices made by management. To connect the choices to value creation and value capture, Casadesus-Masanell and Ricard include consequences in their definition of a business model.

Framework details
Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart define the business model as (i) the set choices and (ii) the set of consequences derirved from those choices. They distinguish between three different types of choices: policies, assets, and governance. Consequences are classified into flexible and rigid.
  • Policies (Choices) Choices regarding the courses of action adopted by the firm regarding all aspects of its operation
  • Assets (Choices) Choices regarding tangible resources such as manufacturing facilities.
  • Governance (Choices) Choices regarding the structure of contractual arrangements that confer decision rights regarding policies or assets.
  • Flexible (Consequences) Consequences that are sensitive to the choices that generate it
  • Rigid (Consequences) Consequences that does not change rapidly with the choices that generate it.
Example using the framework
Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart uses a causal loop diagram, linking choices and consequences by arrows, to represent a business model. As one could make the effort of listing every choice made by management and all consequences of those choices Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart realizes the impracticality and reduces their business model framework to represent (i) choices (generally a subset of all choices), (ii) consequences (generally a subset of all consequences), and (iii) theories. The third element are suppositions on how choices and consequences are related, not a part of the business model, but theories of causality that are believed to be true by the business model designer or analyst.

In the example below Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart illustrates the business model of Ryanair using bold and underlined to indicate choices, with rigid consequences in boxes, and flexible consequences in plain text.


Video illustrating the framework:
  • N/A
Tools for using the framework:
  • Gliffy and other diagram software
Related publications of interest:
  • Linder, J., & Cantrell, S. (2000). Changing business models: Surveying the landscape. Accenture Institute for Strategic Change
  • Casadesus-Masanell, R., & Ricart, J. E. (2007). Competing through Business Models. Working paper.
  • Casadesus-Masanell, R., & Ricart, J. (2010). From Strategy to Business Models and onto Tactics. Long Range Planning .
  • Seelos, C. (2010). Theorizing and Strategizing with Models: Generative Models of Business Models. Working paper . Barcelona, Spain.

Tuesday, December 14, 2010

De Mey and De Ridder's Business Model Framework

Short description of framework: A framework illustrating how value is created and captured in the interaction between organizations through relationships and transactions.

Main strengths: The framework captures relationships, monetary and non-monetary transactions between organizations, and provides a snapshot of the interactions and dependencies on certain external actors. Transactions between several organizations in multiple steps can be illustrated, enabling a good understanding for the different revenue streams.

Background
The framework was originally created by De Mey and De Ridder (www.boardofinnovation.com) in 2009 to create a common visual language and consisted of 10 framework elements initially focusing on the sales side of a business with the only actors being the company itself and its client. The remaining 8 framework elements was items that can be transferred between the company and its client; product, service, experience, reputation, exposure, attention, money and less money.

In 2010 the business model framework was revisited and updated to include 16 framework elements to capture more aspects of a business case. Still, De Mey and De Ridder argues that they prefer not to include what they call secondary stakeholders, showing the supplier side of a business case.

Framework details
The 2010 version contains 16 framework elements, divided into players and objects to exchange further described below. De Mey and De Ridder do not provide their own definitions of the framework elements, so the definitions below are of the general meaning of the terms, based on how the objects are used by De Mey and De Ridder.

My Company - The element represents the organization being described, often at the center of the illustration.

Company - The element represents an external for-profit organization, often the customer in a business-to-business business model.

Consumer - The element represents any individuals or households that use products and services.

Supplier - The element represents any product or service provider to the organization being described.

Non-profit - The element represents organizations such as charity organizations that have an impact on the business model being described.

Government - The element represents an organization or agency, through which a political unit exercises its authority, controls and administers public policy.

Product - The element represents any physical or digital thing produced by labor or effort.

Service - The element represents the act of providing utility without the transfer of ownership.

Experience - The element represents the event of undergoing an emotional feeling.

Exposure/Attention - The element represents the event of concentrating on some features of the environment.

Reputation -The element represents a social evaluation of a person or organization.

Money - The element represents anything that is generally accepted as payment for products and services.

Less Money -The element represents a lower amount of money than the main money object.

Credits - The element represents a fictional currency that can be used as payment for certain products and services.

Data - The element represents information such as content, data and knowledge.

Rights - The element represents a legal freedom to act or refrain from acting.


Example using the framework
In the illustration below De Mey and De Ridder illustrates the business model of Niiu, a German start-up providing customized physical newspapers. Niiu will provide personalized and customized newspapers based on content from a variety of different news companies enabling the consumer to combine different sections from different newspapers. By using print-on-demand technology Niiu will create a unique paper version and deliver to each subscriber. The reader will pay for the newspaper and be exposed to targeted advertising based on their content preferences.

Video illustrating the framework:


Tools for using the framework:
Related publications of interest:
  • Weill, P., & Vitale, M. (2001). Place to space: migrating to ebusiness models. Boston: Harvard Business Press.
  • Gordijn, J., & Akkermans, H. (2001). Designing and Evaluating E-Business Models. Intelligent E-Business .
  • Poel, M., Renda, A., & Ballon, P. (2007). Business model analysis as a new tool for policy evaluation: policies for digital platforms. Research Paper . Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

Sunday, December 12, 2010

List of Key Terms

The term ‘business model’ has historically been defined differently by different academics and consultants, with no common consensus being established. It is not until the last few years that a common definition of what a ‘business model’ is has started to emerge, with an increasing number of authors emphasizing the concepts of value creation and value capture as central to the definition.

One challenge is that frameworks developed from the perspective of enabling business model innovation, are often equated with a definition of the concept of the business model itself. This creates considerable confusion in terms of the differences between the business model of a company, the business model concept as such, and ways of describing business models by adopting different perspectives and frameworks.

In order to provide posts that are easy to follow and to reduce the risk of misunderstandings and confusion, I use the definitions below:
  • Business model – the way an organization creates and captures value
  • Business model concept – the general idea of illustrating how value is created and captured
  • Business model element – a component of how value is created and captured by an organization
  • Business model framework – an abstraction to describe and represent different business models
  • Business model framework element (or framework element) – a component of a business model framework
  • Business model innovation – an innovative business model or the process of innovating a business model
  • Business modeling – the process of testing and simulating different business models
Please consult the list above when confused about my use of any of the terms.

Thursday, November 18, 2010

Evan Williams on the Business Model of Twitter

A very interesting conversation with Evan Williams, co-founder Twitter, on how they are trying different revenue models. “There’s a million ways to make money with Twitter... We’ll probably try a few more... We're surprised it's doing better than expected.”

Thoughts on New Business Models for News

Some interesting thoughts on the future of news at the ReThink News summit held in Newport, Rhode Island, a summit sponsored by The School of Journalism at Michigan State University.

TED founder Richard Saul Wurman


Jim Kennedy, director of strategic planning for the Associated Press


Visual communicator David Gray, founder of Xplane


New York Times Multimedia Editor Andrew Devigal


Chris Finlay of the Business Innovation Factory


Media entrepreneur Brooks Bell


Visual communicator and designer Nigel Holmes



Related videos:

Saturday, October 23, 2010

Mike Maples on pivoting business models

In this presentation Mike Maples, a business angel with previous investments in ngmoco, Chegg, Digg and Odeo/Twitter, talks about developing and pivoting business models, at a Founder Institute event. Mike shares his experiences and provides interesting examples on ngmoco's pricing pivot, Chegg's product pivot, Odeo's company pivot into Twitter.



Mike shares Steve Blanks and several others’ view that “A start-up exists to do one and only one thing and that is to find a business model”. “Once a start-up has achieved a scalable and profitable business model, they are ready to transition from being a start-up to a real company”. Mike represents the business model concept with the following illustration, I believe was developed by Steve Blank and Ann Miura-Ko:

The arrows represent monetary flows in and out from the company. The pivoting starts from formulating hypothesis for each flow, testing assumptions to validate and improve the business model. This approach is very similar to the one presented in Getting to Plan B by John Mullins and Randy Komisar.

Thursday, September 30, 2010

Tom Hulme on How to Visualize your Business Model

Tom is a Design Director at IDEO in London, where he uses the innovation and design process to develop new business opportunities. In these videos he presents a way, very similar to The Business Model Canvas, on how to visualize a business model including the elements of growth- and competitive strategy.





Related posts:
Alexander Osterwalders on the Business Model Canvas
The Evolution of the Business Model Concept

Tuesday, September 7, 2010

Charles Baden-Fuller on why business models are so important for business success

Professor Charles Baden-Fuller talks about the difference between value creation and value capture, robustness, sustainable competitive advantage today and tomorrow, and scalability.

In his recent article in Long Range Planning, Business Models as Models, Charles explores the question "Are Business Models useful?" where he points out that they act as various forms of model: "to provide means to describe and classify businesses; to operate as sites for scientific investigation; and to act as recipes for creative managers".

Sunday, September 5, 2010

The Evolution of the Business Model Concept

Below is a second iteration representing the evolution of the business model concept, including graphical representations, significant publications and books on the subject. Thank you everyone for your input, comments and emails with additional models and publications.

Which business model concepts are you still missing? Which significant publications? Comment below or send feedback to anders@tbmdb.com

Thanks,
Anders

Version 2:

Monday, August 23, 2010

The Evolution of the Business Model Concept (version 1)

Thank you for the input to Version 1 of The Evolution of the Business Model Concept. An updated and extended version of can be found here.

Friday, July 2, 2010

The Design of Business (2009)

The Design of Business: Why design thinking is the next competitive advantage, by Roger Martin was a positive surprise as it was a quick read, well structured, delivered several interesting concepts and some in depth cases on design thinking and business model innovation.

Even though several of the cases are familiar for many readers (such as P&G, Apple, Cirque du Soleil, McDonalds and RIM) Roger, who is dean of the Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto, professor of strategic management, and author of the book The Opposable Mind, adds interesting perspectives and sometimes information from behind the scenes working as a consultant and advisor. The book is an extension of Roger's popular article (free download) from 2004 with the same name.

The book in three bullet points:
  • It introduces and explores the concept of the "Knowledge Funnel" describing how knowledge advances from mystery to heuristic, to algorithm for businesses to gain efficiency and lower costs, and the activities of moving across the knowledge stages (exploration) and operating within each knowledge stage (exploitation).
  • To accelerate the pace at which knowledge advances through the Knowledge Funnel, it presents the concept of design thinking as the necessary balance between analytical thinking using deductive and inductive reasoning (with the need for reliability and the ability to produce consistent and predictable outcomes), and intuitive thinking (with the need for validity and to produce outcomes that meet a desired objective).
  • It discusses challenges (primarily the results of proof-based analytical thinking) faced by organizations, CEOs and individuals within organizations, to build structures and processes that foster, support and reward a culture of design thinking, and how different CEOs have used different approaches to generate successful outcomes.
A brief summary of the different chapters:

1. The knowledge funnel: How discovery takes shape
The introductory chapter starts with a story about McDonalds journey from mystery (how and what did Californians want to eat) to algorithm (stripping away uncertainty, ambiguity, and judgment from almost all processes). It briefly discusses analytical thinking, intuitive thinking and design thinking, to solve mysteries and advance knowledge, and the fine balance between exploring new knowledge and exploiting existing one.
It introduces and explores the concept of the "Knowledge Funnel" describing how knowledge advances from mystery to heuristic, to algorithm for businesses to gain efficiency and lower costs. This is explored also in later chapters: "Mysteries are expensive, time consuming, and risky; they are worth tackling only because of the potential benefits of discovering a path out of the mystery to a revenue-generating heuristic", "The algorithm generates savings by turning judgment… …into a formula or set of rules that, if followed, will produce a desired solution" and “Computer code – the digital end point of the algorithm stage – is the most efficient expression of an algorithm”.

It also addresses the need for organizations to re-explore solved mysteries, even the founding ideas behind the business, and not get too comfortable focusing on the "administration of business" running an existing algorithm.

In addition, the first chapter presents abductive logic, and some ideas originated by philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce; that it is not possible to prove a new thought concept, or idea in advance and that all new ideas can be validated only through the unfolding of future events. To advance knowledge we need to make a "logical leap of the mind" or an "inference to the best explanation" (or "Leaps of Faith" that John Mullins and Randy Komisar calls it in the book Getting to plan B see review/summary) to imaging a heuristic for understanding a mystery. Free preview of Chapter 1

2. The reliability bias: Why advancing knowledge is so hard
The second chapter focus on the distinction between reliability (produce consistent, predictable outcomes by narrowing the scope of a test to what can be measured in a replicable, quantitative way) and validity (produce outcomes that meet a desired objective, that through the passage of time will be shown to be correct, often incorporating some aspects of subjectivity and judgment to be achieved). Roger's main point in the chapter (or even in the book) is that today's business world is focusing too much on reliability (due to three forces: demand for proof, an aversion to bias and the constraints of time), with algorithmic decision-making techniques using various systems (such as ERP, CRM, TQM, KM) to crunch data objectively and extrapolate from the past to make predictions about the future. "What organizations dedicated to running reliable algorithms often fail to realize is that while they reduce the risk of small variations in their businesses, they increase the risk of cataclysmic events that occur when the future no longer resembles the past and the algorithm is no longer relevant or useful" With the turbulent times we live in, where new mysteries constantly spring up that reliable systems won't address or even acknowledge, businesses risk being outflanked by new entrants solving old and new mysteries developing new heuristics and algorithms. "Without validity, an organization has little chance of moving knowledge across the funnel. Without reliability, an organization will struggle to exploit the rewards of its advances… the optimal approach... is to seek a balance of both"

3. Design thinking: How thinking like a designer can create sustainable advantage
Chapter three starts with an interesting case of Research In Motion (RIM) that leads into the discussion of what is really design thinking. Roger uses the quote by Tim Brown of IDEO, "a discipline that uses the designer's sensibility and methods to match people's needs with what is technologically feasible and what a viable business strategy can convert into customer value and market opportunity" and adds himself "a person or organization instilled with that discipline is constantly seeking a fruitful balance between reliability and validity, between art and science, between intuition and analytics, and between exploration and exploitation". That designers live in the world of abductive reasoning, actively look for new data points, challenge accepted explanations to posit what could possibly be true (in contrast to the two dominant forms of logic - deduction and induction, with the goal to declare a conclusion to be true or false).

The chapter ends with the first discussion on roadblocks to design thinking (many more to come), with one being the corporate tendency to settle at the current stage in the knowledge funnel, and another how "highly paid executives or specialists with knowledge, turf and paychecks to defend” has the company's heuristics in their heads with no interest in advancing to the algorithm stage, making the executives less important. This leads nicely into the forth chapter about the transformation of Procter & Gamble.

4. Transforming the corporation: The design of Procter & Gamble
A.G. Lafley's transformation of Procter & Gamble from an incumbent in crisis to an innovative and efficient organization in just a few years has been widely covered in the business literature. As a student some years back I made an internship in P&G's Connect & Develop (connect with innovators outside the company and develop their ideas for P&G products), and have since been reading up on everything I can find about the transition and why other companies have not been able to make the same transition. Roger adds interesting perspectives, from his work with the company and its first vice president of innovation strategy and design, Claudia Kotchka, to develop "a comprehensive program that would provide practical experience in design thinking to P&G leaders". One of the top-down efforts being to drive brand-building from heuristic (in the minds of scarce and costly senior executives) toward algorithm, providing less senior employees the tools needed to do much of the work previously done by high-cost elites who then could then focus on the next mystery in order to create the next brand experience. The chapter also covers the Connect & Develop initiative and how it bulked up P&G's supply of ideas in the mystery-heuristic transition where it was thin, enabling it to feed more opportunities into its well-developed heuristics and algorithms of development, branding, positioning, pricing and distribution.

Another highly interesting topic covered in the chapter is the change of processes within P&G, including the strategy review, at P&G. Lafley recognized that the existing processes was a recipe for producing reliability, not validity, "so risky creative leaps were out of the question". A transition from annual reviews with category managers pitching, "with all the inductive and deductive proof needed to gain the approval of the CEO and senior management" to "forcing category managers to toss around ideas with senior management… to become comfortable with the logical leaps of mind needed to generate new ideas".

5. The balancing act: How design-thinking organizations embrace reliability and validity
The chapter focuses on the need to balance reliability and validity, and the challenges to do so (foremost all structures, processes and cultural norms tilted towards reliability). "Financial planning and reward systems are dramatically tilted toward running an existing heuristic or algorithm and must be modified in significant ways to create a balance between reliability and validity". Roger presents a rough rule of thumb "when the challenge is to seize an emerging opportunity, the solution is to perform like a design team: work iteratively, build a prototype, elicit feedback, refine it, rinse, repeat… On the other hand, running a supply chain, building a forecasting model, and compiling the financials are functions best left to people who work in fixed roles with permanent tasks". The chapter feels somewhat repetitive, in the uphill battle for validity, and more obstacles of change are presented:
  • Preponderance of Training in Analytical Thinking
  • Reliability orientation of key stakeholders
  • Ease of defending reliability vs. validity
In this chapter, Roger also discusses how design-thinking companies have to develop new reward systems and norms, with an example of how to think about constraints. "In reliability-driven, analytical-thinking companies, the norm is to see constraints as the enemy", whereas when validity is the goal "constraints are opportunities" and "they frame the mystery that needs to be solved".

6. World-class explorers: Leading the design-thinking organization
In chapter six several interesting cases, and approaches of different CEOs, are presented, one being the widely covered case of Guy Laliberté, and his Cirque du Soleil. Again Roger adds to the existing body of knowledge with the twist of reliability vs. validity in creating a new market, and the knowledge funnel taking a one-off street festival into an unstoppable international $600 million-a-year business with four thousand employees. Laliberté has reinvented Cirque's creative and business models time and time again, "usually over protests that he was fixing what was not broken and that he could destroy the company". Other CEOs and cases covered in the chapter are James Hackett of Steelcase, Bob Ulrich of Target, and Steve Jobs of Apple.

The role of the CEO and different approaches to build design-friendly organizational processes and norms into companies are discussed referring to the different cases presented.

Again, Roger returns to the reliability vs validity battle, now from a CEO perspective with terms such as "resisting reliability", "those systems-whether they are for budgeting, capital appropriation, product development…", and "counter the internal and external pressures toward reliability".

7. Getting personal: Developing yourself as a design thinker
In the final chapter the focus is on how a non-CEO can function as a design thinker and develop skills to individually produce more valid outcomes even in reliability-oriented companies. Roger refers back to his previous book The Opposable Mind, and the concept of a personal knowledge system as a way of thinking about how we acquire knowledge and expertise. The knowledge system has three components:
  • Stance: "Who am I in the world and what am I trying to accomplish?"
  • Tools: "With what tools and models do I organize my thinking and understand the world?"
  • Experiences: "With what experiences can I build my repertoire of sensitivities and skills.
Roger then presents the design thinker's stance, key tools (observation, imagination, and configuration), and how to obtain experiences by trying new things and test their boundaries.

Roger also presents five things that the design thinker needs to do to be more effective with colleagues at the extremes of the reliability and validity spectrum:
  • Reframe extreme views as a creative challenge
  • Empathize with your colleagues on the extremes
  • Learn to speak the languages of both reliability and validity
  • Put unfamiliar concepts in familiar terms
  • When it comes to proof, use size to your advantage

This is a great book and I recommend business developers and business model innovators to buy it, as it is a quick read with several important concepts and interesting cases to learn from. I believe design thinking has the potential to help managers break out from the Matrix they live in and again realize the real world behind the existing algorithms.

If you find this book review/summary helpful, please go to the Amazon book review page and rate my identical review "Helpful" Thanks!

Disclaimer: I read the book at the beautiful cliffs of Vernazza in Italy, and was in a very good mood. I actually read the book twice.

Other book reviews/summaries:
Business Model Generation (2009)
Getting to Plan B (2009)
Seizing the White Space (2010)

Monday, June 14, 2010

Sunday, June 13, 2010

ngMoco, Guitar Hero and EA Sports in panel discussion on the monetization of games

A nice panel discussion at the Play Conference about the monetization of games moderated by Douglass Perry, covering topics such as Old versus new distribution models, Usage at the center of the business model, Monetizing usage vs downloads, User experience based on platform, Competing with other forms of entertainment, Selling where the customer is and Dynamically and remotely optimization of games and business models. Also interesting to hear how accessories and physical products are affecting business models of software companies that are used to not having any inventory.

Participants:
Neil Young, CEO ngMoco
Kai Huang, Founder Guitar Hero
Peter Moore, President EA Sports



Related videos:

Tuesday, April 27, 2010

Randy Komisar on Getting to Plan B

Randy Komisar, partner at Kleiner Perkins Caufield and Byers, and co-author of Getting to Plan B (see review/summary here), discusses the main ideas from his book.



Related posts:
Getting to Plan B (2009)

Friday, April 23, 2010

Is Android Evil?

This is a guest post by Andreas Constantinou, an expert in the ecosystems of network operators, handset manufacturers and mobile service providers, research director at VisionMobile and a frequent speaker on the topic of mobile open source.


You thought Android was open? The Android governance model consists of an elaborate set of control points that allows Google to bundle its own services and control the exact software and hardware make-up on every handset. All this while touting the openness rhetoric that is founded on the Apache permissive license used in the Android SDK.

Whereas Android is completely open for the software developer ecosystem, it’s completely closed for the handset OEM (pre-load) ecosystem. There is no other platform which is so asymmetrical in terms of its governance structures.

Indeed, Google’s mobile platform is the smartest implementation of open source designed for driving commercial agendas. But before we dig into why, it’s worth discussing why Android’s success has very little to do with open source.

What makes Android tick
Despite early skepticism, Google’s Android operating system has been unequivocally supported by the mobile industry, including more network operators and handset manufacturers than one can count – with the stubborn exception of Nokia. Android managed to ramp from 1 handset model in 2008 to 50+ models announced for 2010 launch, leaving most industry observers in awe.

The Android success has nothing to do with open source; it’s owed to three key factors:

- Apple. As strange as it might seem, Android owes much of its success to one of its arch-rivals. Let me explain. With the unprecedented success of the iPhone and the take-it-or-leave-it terms dictated by Apple to network operators, the carriers have been eagerly looking for cheaper alternatives; as such the tier-1 operators have been embarking on Android projects to produce iPhones for people who can’t afford the iPhone and more importantly, without forking out the 300EUR+ subsidy needed to remain competitive in an iPhone market.

- Network operators/carriers around the world are eager to differentiate. Android provides the allure of a unified software platform supporting operator differentiation at a low cost (3 months instead of 12+ months offered by SavaJe, which was also aimed at the MNO customisation market). For larger operators with a software strategy, Android also presents a safe investment, as the mainstream option for bringing down the cost of smartphones. That’s why most Android handset projects are backed by a commercial bipoles of operator + OEM deals, with purchase commitments and NRE fees coming from the operator.

- Qualcomm. The $10B chipset vendor has been paramount to Android’s ramp up; manufacturers can take Qualcomm’s hardware reference design which is pre-integrated with Android and can go to market within an estimated 9-12 months (down from 16 months for the Motorola Cliq handset and 24+ months for the HTC G1). Besides Qualcomm we should also mention TI’s OMAP3 platform (on which Moto Droid is based) and ST Ericsson and Broadcom who are ramping up to offer chipsets with out-of-the-box support for Android.

In other words, in an Android handset, most of the OEM budget goes into differentiation; compare that to Symbian where most of the OEM budget goes into baseporting (radio and functional integration of hardware) due to historical choices made by Symbian in 2001. All-in-all, Android allows OEMs to reduce their R&D budgets and invest in differentiation, which is mana from heaven to manufacturers.

We should also not forget the ‘free factor’ (technically zero per-unit royalties for the public SDK) which stirred the emotional hype around Android handsets.

All in all, the ‘open source’ marketing moniker has been very successful at triggering major industry disruption – incl. Nokia ’s acquisition of Symbian and the derailment of Windows Mobile. Perhaps more importantly, the openness rhetoric and the Google aura has attracted thousands of developers on the platform, at a time when the money equation is sub-par; consider that – compared to the Apple devices – Android handsets are around 9x less in volume and paid-for apps are available in 6x fewer countries.

Behind the Open Source facade
What’s even more fascinating is how closed Android is, despite Google’s old don’t be evil mantra and the permissive Apache 2 license which Android source code is under. Paraphrasing a famous line from Henry Ford’s book on the Model-T, anyone can have Android in their own colour as long as it’s black. Android is the best example of how a company can use open source to build up interest and community participation, while running a very tight commercial model.

How does Google control what services, software and hardware ships in Android handsets? The search giant has built an elaborate system of control points around Android handsets.

To dig deeper we spent two months talking to industry sources close to Android commercials – and the reality has been startling. From a high level, Google uses 8 control points to manage the make-up of Android handsets:

1. Private branches. There are multiple, private codelines available to selected partners (typically the OEM working on an Android project) on a need-to-know basis only. The private codelines are an estimated 6+ months ahead of the public SDK and therefore essential for an OEM to stay competitive. The main motivation for the public SDK and source code is to introduce the latest features (those stemming from private branches) into third party apps.

2. Closed review process. All code reviewers work for Google, meaning that Google is the only authority that can accept or reject a code submission from the community. There is also a rampant NIH (not invented here) culture inside Google that assumes code written by Googlers is second to none. Ask anyone who’s tried to contribute a patch to Android and you hear the same story: very few contributions get in and often no reason is offered on rejection.

3. Speed of evolution. Google innovates the Android platform at a speed that’s unprecedented for the mobile industry, releasing 4 major updates (1.6 to 2.1) in 18 months. OEMs wanting to build on Android have no choice but to stay close to Google so as not to lose on new features/bug fixes released. The Nexus One, Motorola Droid, HTC G1 and other Experience handsets serve the purpose of innovation testbeds for Google.

4. Incomplete software. The public source code is by no means sufficient to build a handset. Key building blocks missing are radio integration, international language packs, operator packs – and of course Google’s closed source apps like Market, Gmail and GTalk. There are a few custom ROM builders with a full Android stack like the Cyanogen distribution, but these use binaries that are not licensed for distribution in commercial handsets.

5. Gated developer community. Android Market is the exclusive distribution and discovery channel for the 40,000+ apps created by developers; and is available to phone manufacturers on separate agreement. This is one of the strongest control points as no OEM would dare produce a handset that doesn’t tap into the Android Market (perhaps with the exception of DECT phones, picture frames, in-car terminals or other exotic uses of Android). However, one should acknowledge that Android’s acceptance process for Market apps is liberal as it gets – and the complete antithesis of the Apple vetting process for apps.

6. Anti-fragmentation agreement. Little is known about the anti-fragmentation agreement signed by OHA members but we understand it’s a commitment to not release handsets which are not CTS compliant (more on CTS later).

7. Private roadmap. The visibility offered into Android’s roadmap is pathetic. At the time of writing, the roadmap published publicly is a year out of date (Q1 2009). To get a sneak peak into the private roadmap you need Google’s blessing.

8. Android trademark. Google holds the trademark to the Android name; as a manufacturer you can only leverage on the Android branding with approval from Google, much like how you need Sun’s approval to claim your handset is Java-powered.

In short, it’s either the Google way or the highway. If you want to branch off Android you ‘re completely on your own and you need resources of the size of China Mobile (see their OMS effort) to make it viable (hint: China Mobile is the biggest network operator bar none).

The Open Handset Alliance is another myth; since Google managed to attract sufficient industry interest in 2008, the OHA is simply a set of signatures with membership serving only as a VIP Club badge.

Another big chapter in the Android saga is the CTS (compatibility test suite) which is the formal testing process by which a handset passes Google requirements. According to our sources, CTS extends significantly beyond API compliance, and into performance testing, hardware features, device design, UI specs and bundled services. CTS is based on the principle of ensuring baseline compliance, so it’s ok to add features, but it’s not ok to detract; compare this with Apple’s no-Flash policy. Note that beyond CTS compliance, there are additional commercial licensing agreements that OEMs have to sign for Google services and private line access.

CTS hampers Android’s progress as well, as it precludes OEMs from creating stripped-down versions of Android that would fit on mass-market phones – those shipping in the 10s of millions. CTS – and forward compatibility to the pool of 40,000+ apps – is Google’s main challenge for hitting a 2-digit market share in the smartphone market. These restrictions – and frienemy relationship between Google and its OEM partners – have stirred up discussions of an ‘Android foundation‘ within OEM circles

The Google Endgame
With Android, Google aims to deliver a consistent platform to its own revenue-generating services. For now, this is the ad business. But in the future, Google is aiming at voice (reaching the billions who don’t have a data connection) and Checkout (i.e. becoming the Visa of mobile).

Yet whatever the endgame, it’s worth realising that [from the manufacturer perspective] Android is no more open – and no less closed – than [licensable operating systems like] Windows Mobile, Symbian and BREW; it’s the smartest implementation of open source aimed at driving commercial agendas. Android is much less about the do-no-evil rhetoric that the PR spinners in Mountain View would like us to think.

So, is Android evil? No, it isn’t. It has done no harm – quite the contrary, Android has boosted the level of innovation on mobile software. The point of the article is not to vilify Google or concoct visions of Darth Vader; but to balance the level of openness hysteria with a reality check on the commercial dynamics of mobile open source.

Tuesday, April 20, 2010

Dwayne Spradlin on The Power of Open Innovation

Dwayne Spradlin, CEO InnoCentive, on Open Innovation and the power of getting the crowd to work.

"Two skills that organizations need are:
  1. They need to understand how to engage communities, communicate with them, build communities and trust, and that does require effort by organizations to do it well.
  2. Organizations need to understand how to ask and how to process their own problems and prioritize those in ways that they typically never done before."



Related posts:
Using the crowd as a part of the business model
10 Initiatives using the crowd to generate new ideas

Sunday, March 7, 2010

Seizing the White Space (2010)

The book, Seizing the White Space: Business Model Innovation for Growth and Renewalby Mark W. Johnson, is a rather quick read and primarily for people who have not read Business Model Generation: A Handbook for Visionaries, Game Changers, and Challengersby Alex Osterwalder, Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make Competition Irrelevantby W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne, and Clayton M. Christensen's The Innovator's Dilemma.

For people who have followed the development of the business model concept, and read case studies such as Southwest Airlines, Hilti, Xerox, Kodak, DEC, FedEx, and Tata, this book is a bit of a disappointment. I looked forward to reading this book and wanted it to be a 5 star experience, but after reading it I have more questions about the author and the writing of the book, than about any new content or ideas.

The book in three bullet points:
  • It presents the concept "White Space" defined as an area where new or existing customers are served in fundamentally different ways and there is a poor fit with the current (incumbent) organization; "The range of potential activities not defined or addressed by the company's current business model".
  • It provides a business model framework, "The four box business model", comprising a customer value proposition, a profit formula and key resources and processes, very similar to the model presented in the 2008 HBR article Reinventing Your Business Modelby Mark W. Johnson, Clayton M. Christensen, and Henning Kagermann, with the focus point on the customers' job-to-be-done .
  • It briefly explores the circumstances when a new business model might be needed, being when you must change your current profit formula (overhead cost structure, resource velocity or both), develop many new kinds of key resources and processes, and/or create fundamentally different core metrics, rules and norms to run your business.
A brief summary of the different chapters:

1. The White Space and Business Model Innovation
Introductory discussion on core vs. non-core business, defining the white space that lies far outside an organization's usual way of working, where assumptions are high and knowledge is low. In contrast to the Blue Ocean concept, described in the book Blue Ocean Strategy by W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne, (not mentioned in Seizing the White Space), the white space focus on what a specific organization can do, whereas blue ocean is about doing things differently than competition to be in uncontested markets. In the first chapter Mark includes a nice table on companies founded in the last quarter century that have entered the Fortune 500 in the last decade.

The book contains some questionable statements without references or discussion and chapter one is no exception: "Most successful innovative business models are forged by start-ups" (p. 18) - I would like to see the reference and discussion (and definition of "successful", "innovative" and "start-up") as most examples and discussions covered in this book are not on start-ups.

2. The Four-Box Business Model Framework
The chapter starts off with the discussion about the lack of a shared vocabulary, "No one to my knowledge squarely focuses on the elements in the business system that are central to value's creation and delivery and the way those elements work together to ensure or impede the overall success of the enterprise" (p. 23) I laughed out loud when I read the references related to the statement above, all from the same page: Peter Drucker (Harvard Business Review), Joan Magretta (Harvard Business School, former strategy editor Harvard Business Review), Henry William Chesbrough x2 (Harvard Business School Press). I would argue that the MAIN reason why there is a lack of shared vocabulary regarding business models is due to academics/consultants that ignore the work of other academics/consultants working in other schools/companies than their own.

The first element of Mark's Four-Box Framework is the Customer Value Proposition (CVP), an offering that helps customers more effectively, reliably, conveniently, or affordably solve an important problem (or satisfy a job-to-be-done) at a given price. In some versions of the model, such as Figure 9, 19, 20 and 24, there is no explicit customer mentioned in the CVP. In other versions, such as Figure 21 and in the model presented in the 2008 HBR article "Reinventing you business model", a target customer is included. The second element is the Profit Formula that defines how the company will create value for itself and its shareholders. It specifies the revenue model, the cost structure, target unit margin and how quickly resources need to be used to support target volume. The third element is Key Resources, the people, technology, products, equipment, information, channels, partnerships, funding, and brand required to deliver the value proposition to the customer. The fourth and final element is Key Processes such as design, development, sourcing, manufacturing, marketing, hiring and training by which a company delivers on the customer value proposition. Readers familiar with popular concepts such as Osterwalder's business model canvas recognize most terms and ideas.

3. The White Space Within: Transforming Existing Markets
Chapter three discuss business model innovation opportunities within existing markets by delivering new customers value propositions, something Mark argues often relate to predictable shifts in what customers are willing to pay a premium price for (at least the primary basis of competition). He presents an argument based on one example on how companies compete and differentiate with different forms of innovation according to the figure below. The references used for the "predictable shifts" are to colleague Christensen's The Innovator's Dilemma, and Geoffrey A. More's Crossing the Chasm, a book about selling disruptive products to mainstream customers. I would love to read more about these shifts, the research behind it, and how for example design and the use of brands affects the shifts in the basis of competition?
The chapter contains a nice case study on Dow Corning and Xiameter (mostly covered in HBR article from 2009), and the more classical case studies on Hilti, FedEx and IKEA.

4. The White Space Beyond: Creating New Markets
Seizing the white space beyond means developing new business models to serve entirely new customers and create new markets, often where large groups of potential customers are shut out of a market because existing offerings are too expensive, complicated or that the potential customers lack access. In the chapter Mark provides a table of archetypal business models and a nice case study on Hindustran Unilever and the Shakti Initiative together with some shorter versions covering MinuteClinic and SAP.

Obvious concepts to discuss in relation creating new markets are the tools, frameworks and methodologies presented in Blue Ocean Strategyby W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne. Even though the Blue Ocean Strategy concepts are trademark protected, registered by ITM Research (INSEAD), other authors have been able to refer to the concepts and tools presented in the book.

5. The White Space Between: Dealing with Industry Discontinuity
Chapter five focus on the uncharted territory between what was and what is to be, after game changing events such as the commercialization of Internet technology or the push to address greenhouse gas emissions. Mark presents ideas in relation to unpredictable or radical shifts in market demand, in technology and in government policy targeted at the business environment. Examples are in the defense industry (transformative market shifts), Encyclopaedia Britannica (technology driven shifts), and Better Place (shifts in government policy and regulation). The chapter also contains a nice table including the industries and infrastructure of each technological revolution, from Carlota Perez' Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital.

6. Designing a New Business Model
In the chapter Mark discusses the business model innovation process from identifying a job-to-be-done to creating the customer value proposition, and compares the new business model that would be required with the existing model. When searching for unfilled jobs-to-be-done Mark puts emphasis on not only functional aspects of a job but also its social and emotional aspects, together with a short reflection on that Web 2.0 tools give businesses the ability to deeply understand their customers through increased interaction, with Threadless as an example. He introduces a way to use levers to contrast offerings, and mentions the reverse income statement to working up the projections for a business with a new profit formula. This chapter also contains an original and interesting case study from a project undertaken by Innosight with the customer name changed for purposes of confidentiality and a table with business model analogies.

7. Implementing the Model
For the implementation of a new business model, Mark describes three stages: incubation (1-3 years), acceleration (2-5 years), and transition (1-3 years). Incubation is the process of testing (early, cheaply and often) to identify and verify the assumptions most critical to success. Once the new model is proven viable, the Acceleration stage focus on setting up processes, together with rules, norms and metrics, to make the business model profitable. The final stage addresses the question if the new business can be integrated into the core or if it must remain a separate unit in order to thrive. Mark also discusses acquisitions and some successful and less successful examples.

8. Overcoming Incumbent Challenges
In the final chapter Mark describes three dangers incumbent face when implementing new business models: 1) Failure the allocate resources, 2) The Urge to cram new opportunities into the existing business model, and 3) Impatience for growth. He also briefly addresses the problem of the existing rules, norms, and metrics used by the company something that would be very interesting to dig deeper into.

My main questions after reading this book:
Why do Mark ignore existing body of knowledge and obvious references when defining the White space and his business model framework, and instead almost exclusively refer to his own or colleagues' work? Why does he focus so much on old examples, already covered in other books and articles, without using his frameworks to provide more depth into the cases? Why not look at modern examples of companies pushing its core business into new areas? Why are several included figures not referenced in the text, nor referenced for source?

A quick comparison with some other popular books on business models:
All in all, Seizing the White Space is a good book, containing many valuable lessons. It will not WOW you, and it presents surprisingly few new case studies. One of the most important (implicit) lessons from the book is that business models need to be consciously designed and that companies must always stay on their toes looking for new opportunities around their core business, but also in the white space.

If you find this book review/summary helpful, please go to the Amazon book review page and rate my identical review "Helpful" Thanks!